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ABSTRACT
Mathematical game theory plays an important role in the field of military
operations research. A sound knowledge of utility theory is necessary in
order that one may comprehend clearly the practical uses and limitations
of game theory in situations of military interest. The utility function
postulated by Von Neuman and Morgenstern in Theory of Game s and Economic
Behavior is discussed here in some detail. Included in this discussion
are: a short historical background of utility; a non-rigorous demonstra-
tion of the existence of the utility function^, based upon a reasonable
set of assumptions; a discussion of the mathematical properties of the
utility function; a summary of the major criticisms of the Von Meuman<=
Morgenstern utility function; and some examples of recent theoretical
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This paper was written during the period January-May 8 1961 s at the
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School,, Monterey., California. It is intended
for the reader who desires a fuller treatment of utility theory than is
usually given in a study of game theory. It is not intended to be a i
ous mathematical exposition; an elementary knowledge of convex sets is all
that is required of the reader.
A few words of explanation are in order concerning the reference notes
contained in the paper. A numerical superscript represents a footnote.
The superscripts follow a sequential numbering scheme throughout the par.- a
and the entire body of footnotes is located at the end of the paper s immedi-
ately preceding the bibliography. A letter., followed by a number,, tl
wh<-»le enclosed in parentheses, refers to material in the bibliography. The
bibliography contains material cited in the paper as well as reference mats
al not specifically cited.
The writer is indebted to Professor Charles C. Torrance for his un-
tiring patience, enthusiasm and guidance as the First Reader. The writer
is no less indebted to Professor Franklin F. Sheehan j, the Second Reader 8 w!
m£ny helpful suggestions and criticisms were indispensable to the writing
this paper. Professors Torrance and Sheehan are also thanked for their
forbearance during the 'prenatar'period of this paper 8 in which the writer
touched upon (and discarded) a host of related and unrelated subjects. The
writer would also like to thank Mrs. Norma Stevens for her devotion to duty




UTILITY : ITS DEFINITION AND HISTORY

Definition of Utility
Historically 9 the term utility has been used by economists to in-
dicate the capacity of an item to stimulate desire on the part of the
i
consumer . Within the framework of this broad defination 9 a consider-
able amount of material;, both good and bad 9 has appeared in the economic
literature. In order to eliminate possible confusion 9 it should be clear-
ly stated that in this paper the terms "utility" 9 "utility function"^ and
"utility theory" , refer to a specialized theory of preference quantifica-
tion introduced by Von Neuman and Morgenstern in Theory of Games and Econom-
ic Behavior (V2).
The Von Neuman and Morgenstern utility function is variously described
as "..a method of applying a numerical utility scale other than the price
2
system to a set of human preferences, ." "<>o<,a function that arithmetlzes
3
the relation of preference among acts.."
,
"...a measure scale for the
4
degree of preference between decisions.."
.
In the above definitions 9 as in most such definitions 9 the recurring
theme is that of quantizing preferences among a set of decisions or acts
leading to specified outcomes. The specialized nature of the utility func-
tion thus defined » and the mathematical theory underlying this function^
will be discussed in a later section of this paper.
History of Utility Theory
The history of modern utility theory can be traced back to Daniel
Bernoulli (1700-1782) of the famous mathematical family"". One of
Bernoulli's first papers, which was published in 1738 9 contained his theory
6
of "moral worth" and "moral expectation" „ Bernoulli" s paper challenged
the validity of using mathematical expectation as the criterion for decision-
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making in situations involving monetary risks.
The principle of mathematical expectation can best be explained by a
simple example. Consider a game of chance involving monetary prizes,, In
such a game, the mathematical expectation of gain is simply the sum of the
products of the monetary values of the prizes and their respective probabili-
ties of occurrence. Theoretically, in a '"fair" game of chance on would be
willing to pay an amount equal to the mathematical expectation of gain for
the privilege of participating in the game,
Bernoulli proposed that a given sum of money is not of equal importance
to different individuals, but, instead, that there is m '"moral worth1'' which
represents the relative value of money to different individuals. Bernoulli
illustrated his principle with several examples, the most famous being the
proposed solution to the St. Petersburg Paradox.
The St. Petersburg Paradox was first publicised by Bernoulli i uncle,
Nicholas Bernoulli, . In its simplest form B the paradox is re
as resulting from a simple coin-tossing game; somewhat surprise
mathematical expectation of gain is infinity, so that by the principle of
mathematical expectation, one should be willing to pay an infinite amount of
money to participate in the game, even though each possible outcome of the
game yields only a finite gain.
To resolve this paradox, Bernoulli postulated that the "moral worth"
(utility) of money increases with increasing amounts of money, but that the
rate of increase decreases with increasing amounts of money. He went
by suggesting that the "moral worth" function be represented by a log*
curve; specifically, he proposed to represent the utility of M dollars by
the logarithm (to any base) of M. In the St. Petersburg Parasox s«
function does indeed yield a finite "moral expectation".
3
/
Bernoulli's choice of the logarithm as the measure of utility has
been criticized on several grounds
s
the most obvious criticism being that
the choice of the measure was completely arbitrary. It is of historical
interest to note that Bernoulli's paper reproduced a portion of a letter
from Gabriel Cramer to Nicholas Bernoulli; this letter chronologically
establishes Cramer's priority to the idea of utility. Cramer suggested
that "..The pleasure derivable from a sum of money may be taken to vary
8
as the square root of the sum.' However,, it was Bernoulli's formula-
tion of the problem^, together with some ideas that were specifically hi®
own 9 that became popular and have exerted wide influence.
EconomistSj, in later years
s
accepted Bernoulli's idea of "moral worth"
and attached to it the name utility. Emphasis was placed upon the Intrinsic
utility to an individuals, of a consequence u without considering the associ-
ated probabilities. A utility function based upon this notion was developed;
and was extended to cover other consequences than money 8 such as commodities
and services, and combinations of commodities and services.
During the twentieth century
s
this "classical" concept of a utility
function- -sans probability-- has been generally discredited in the eyes of
economists and mathematicians. This is due to the fact that such a func-
tion does not have the necessary uniqueness properties to have many applica-
9
tions „ Vi Ifredo Pareto first demonstrated that the classical utility
function is unique only up to a monotonically increasing transformation.
Specifically
s
any monotonically increasing function of such a utility
function is an equally good utility function. To economists,, such a func-
tion has little real usefulness.
In the late 1920' s there was a revival of interest in the original
Bernoullian concept of utility. The late Frank P. Ramsey published a
4

series of papers (R 1) which were to form the basis of the so-called
jective probabilistic school of utility theory, which will be discussed
in a later section of this paper.
Apparently, however , Ramsey" s essays exerted little influence at
the time , and it was not until the publication of the Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior in 1944 that there was an intense revival of interest
in utility theory,, Von Neuman and Morgenstern°s application of a mathemati-
cal theory to the solution of games in the proper sense (card games, etc),
as well as to economic and sociological problems, was extremely interest-
ing to economists and mathematicians. An axiomatic derivation of a numeri-
cal utility was included in their book 9 but in the form of a digression,
ince utility theory, while playing a key role in game theory
part of game theory itself. Utility theory assumes increasing importance
when game theoretic concepts are applied to real-world situations.
From 1944 until the present time, interest in utility theory, both as
a theoretical and as a practical concept, has continued unabated. Mot sur-




DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE OTILITY FUNCTION

DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION UNDER A REASONABLE
SET OF CONDITIONS.
It Is the purpose of this section to demonstrate the existence for








set of axioms. For purposes of simplicity, the utility function to be dis-
cussed will be restricted to the special case In which the basic set of
prises is finite in number. Also, for every distinct pair of prlzes 9 A„
and A,, either A a is preferred to A, or A, is preferred to A . „ In the nota-
j 1 j j i
tion above
s
A is defined to be the prize most preferred;, and A the prize
least preferred, A rigorous demonstration of the existence of the general-
ized utility function Is not encumbered by the restrictions listed above.
However 9 such a demonstration is considerably more complicated than the one
presented here.
Prior to a detailed discussion of the utility function proper^ a few
words are in order concerning mathematical systems and mathematical models
in general.
A mathematical system consists of a set of elements; relations among
the elements; operations on the elements; and a set of axioms or postulates
concerning the elements
s
relations^ and operations. In utilizing mathe-
matical models the scientist attempts to abstract a real-world situation
into a mathematical system. The mathematical system acts as a model of the
real-world situation. The mathematical conclusions which may be arrived at
are then Interpreted in terms of physical conclusions related to the real-
world situation. Experimental verification of these conclusions is the




The various steps are represented schematically as follows:
ABSTRACTION
CONCLUSIONS
PHYSICAL !<&—• INTERPRETATION [
In the case of the utility function^, the mathematical model which
will be utilized is a line segment in Euclidean one- space „ The mathemati-
cal systems underlying this model will not be explicitly outlIned 8 the
assumption being made that the reader has a basic knowledge of the systems
involved. Certain simple properties of the points in this line segment
will be stated without proof 9 and certain mathematical conclusions will
be drawn from these properties.
The next step in the process will be the correlation of this mathe-
matical model with the real-world situation of preference quantification
Specifically j, we will idealize and axioraatlz© an individuals criteria for
expressing preferences among a finite set of prizes in such a way as
!
make these criteria conform to the basic set of properties inherent in the
mathematical model. The so-called utility function thus arrived at will be
one
,) Prize A, is preferred to prize A if and only if the utility of
) 9 i*s greater the utility of A „ U{A '* ..
(2) The utility of a gamble involving prizes A 8 A^.. 00 A 8 with pro-
l jl r
babilities p s P^ 9 o <>p is the sum of the products of the U(A )
„r respective probabilities.

utility function Is unique up to a linear transformation.
Mathematical Model
tder a line segment of
b, with the coordinate of b larger than the coordinate of a
What do we know about the infinite number of points contained in the line
segment (a 9 b)? Among other things 8 we know that these points constitute
a simply ordered convex set. More specifIcally 9 we can say that the set
of points contained In the line segment (a 9 b) have the following properties;
I. For every distinct pair of points 9 i 9 j &(& s h) s
(1) either i > j or j > I
(2) if 1 > j and j> k 9 then 1> k
Ho Every point i W (a 9 b) is uniquely expressafele as t
combination" of a and b 9 i e„ 9
• : <-(/ lG» I j
This implies that there Is a unique one-to-one correspondence between
"i" and " <&%V\ In other words 9 we can characterise ,9 i 0v by its M
(symbolically; i *fe^ ^C i)
.
III. For any two points i 9 j 9 <£ (a 9 b) 9 the points lying in the inter-
val spanned by i 9 j constitute in themselves a convex set 9 which
intersects the convex set defined over (a 9 b') Theref©re 9 any
point in the interval (i 9 j) is expressible as a convex combination
of i and j as well as being expressible as a convex combination of






IV. (1) Any given convex combination of any of the points in (a,
represents some point pg(a
s
b) !<>&<,»




(2) Any given convex combination of convex combinations represents
some point q g (a 8 b);i.e. 8 if a convex combination of the from





CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE PROPERTIES OUTLINED ABOVE
As a result of the properties outlined above
s
we can draw the
following important conclusions;
(1) if i > j then &{£ > «?<••£
If &i > - then i. p> j
Discussion ; This is a direct result of the one-to-one correspondence
between i and :;IC, mentioned in II.
(2) if ps^+^t-Mffl) j fotV-i);£v
Discussion ; Since "p" is an element of (a 9 b) s it is uniquely ex-
pressable in terms of a and b; hence p (as well as i 9 j>,...n) can
be characterized by its t>(p . Substituting .--.,• for p 9 . *: . for i„
u% ; for j„ etc., in (2) above yields the desired result.
(3) - <„ Is unique up to a linear transformation.
Discussion; In Prop. -I we stated that the characterization of
i by its afc is unique. This is true because we originally speci-
fied the end points a and b. There fore
,
-t, Is unique with respect
to that set of end points. However^ we are perfectly free to chooss
ra@w end points as long as the new "b" is larger than the new "a". We
will then indeed get a new value for •,,,[ based upon the new set of
end points* This value is unique with respect to the new end points.
The above is generally summarized by saying that e(« is unique up to
a linear transformation.
PREFERENTIAL ANALOGUE
At this point we will attempt to correlate the purely mathematical
notions discussed above with a set of notions concerning preference quantifi-
cation.
As a starter we will establish a correspondence between some mathe-
matical relationships and some preferential relationships;
Mathematical Preferential
^ (greater than) /* (is preferred to)
•^ (equals) <f~*~> (is indifferent to)
We will also establish the following correspondence between mathe-





(represents a convex combination
of a and b)
Using the preferential relationships and operations listed
will now postulate a set of axioms concerning the "rational"
an individual when faced with a series of gambles involving a
of prizes A......A . The reader will recall that we are cons
1 r
the special case in which no two prizes are equally preferred by
dividual. Each assumption will be followed by a statement re
one of the properties of the mathematical model listed above.
, A,.; (|->)/
(represents a gamble which
results in prize A with
r
probability •¥• and in prize
A with probability 1-'."- .
The above symbolism is used
to emphasize the fact that
at this point we are not yet
in a position to perform an
out-and-out numerical opera-
tion such as the formation






For every distinct pair of prizes A and A„ the in
state that he either prefers A, to A, or that he prefers A„ to A„. Also
1 j j 3L
we postulate that if he prefers A to A. and A„ to A,
s
then he will always
i J j k
prefer A to A. 8 i.e, 9
for every distinct pair of przies A, and A
}
dther A. V A, or A.V A.
i j J
f A
f > :hen A .
*
j r -v -"~ "tr *v





For every A among the set of prizes, there exists a probability,.
-X A.j such that the individual is indifferent between receiving prizn
A with probability one and taking a gamble which results in prize A
with probability '<J\k, and prize A with probability (1- ^A^).
This corresponds to mathematical property 11,
ASSUMPTION #3
The gamble which the individual considers equivalent to prize A,
i
(see assumption #2) is freely substitutable for prize A in other gamble
involving A,
.
frhis corresponds to mathematical property IV. (1)1
ASSUMPTION #4
Any complex gamble, i.e., a gamble having as its prizes other gamble
can be reduced to a simple gamble involving only the A, "a as prizes.
|This corresponds to mathematical property IV (2) and II]
ASSUMPTION #5
Preference among gambles is transitive.
if
and
then S , — >v,A,I] > |jiAl; -- <\
jlThis corresponds to mathematical properties
IV.




A gamble, [>A^ 0—>) Aj is preferred to Ift.
if and only if "N > ^
„s corresponds to mathematical property IlJ
In the assumptions above we have 9 in effect 9 stated that the ideal-
ized behavior of an individual in a series of gambles 8 undertaken for the
purpose of quantifying his preferences among a finite set of prizes,, has the
same properties as our original mathematical model consisting of a line
segment
.
To arrive at the utility function,, U(A„), we need only to assign
i
values to prizes A and A, s denoted by U(A ) and U(A,) 9 and to represent
r 1 r " 1






un it*- o oin
_
"^ A is sometimes referred to as the '"index of utility'" of priz«
j
A. « Knowing &\k. s we are able to arrive at a value for U(A S ),
i i
i.e., &(^ <^^ U($jl
If the value assigned to A is one and the value assigned t© A- is zero
s
Jthen «J%A is identically equal to U(A ).
The mathematical preference model which we achieve in the final step
above is completely analogous to the abstract mathematical model defined
on the line segment. We can therefore draw the same conclusions with re-




(1) If A. > A„ s then U(A.) >
if U(A.) > U(A,), then A. V A
^ J *• J
14

(2) If "p Is a gamble resulting in A. with probability p. r A~ with
ility p» s etc, , tl
U(P) - P. UfA.) + P U(A ) + ...P U(A )
1 1 22 r ' r
(3) U(A ) is unique up to a linear transformation.
The reader will recall that in our mathematical model we referred to
the infinite number of points along the line segment (a
s
b). However,, in
the preference analogue we referred to a finite set of prizes
s
A... ..A .
One might ask how we account for the infinity of "points" between A and
A . The answer is that these points represent the utility indices of all
the gambles (infinite in number) among the basic set of prizes^ such
being theoretically capable of evaluation as a result of ASSUMPTION #4.
In conclusion 9 it should again be mentioned that a rigorous derivat
of the utility function allows for an infinite number of prizes; and It
allows the individual to be indifferent between two prizes., Discussions
in later sections concerning the mathematical properties and the critic-





MATHEMATICAL PROPERTIES OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION
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MATHEMATICAL PROPERTIES OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION
Some interesting questions arise concerning the possibility of mathe-
matical operations on the Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function other
than the formation of "convex combinations". For example,-, one might in-
quire as to the meaningfulness of addition of utilities*, or of subtraction
of utilities*, or of the formation of convex combinations of sums or diff-
ences of utilities. The answers found in the literature, particularly
the last two quest ions 9 are somewhat confusing and misleading. Before
answering the above quest ions^ it is first necessary to investigate in
detail the various types of measurement scales.
Measurement Scales
In a very broad sense a measurement scale is defined simply as a rule
for assigning numbers to objects or events,, or to classes of objects or
13
events . Within this broad framework scales are further classified as
being either nominal, ordinal 9 interval s or ratio scales. Each of the cate-
gories has its distinguishing structure.
Nominal Scale
The nominal scale is the simplest of all scales in that it consist
of a one-to-one mapping from a domain of objects,, or classes of obje^i.
into a range of numbers. According to Stevens (S5 i many consider it absurd
to dignify this process by the title of measurement. He points out s how=
ever 8 that it does fall under the general heading of assigning numbers
according to a rule
s
the rule being; do not assign the same number t
than one object or class of objects^ and do not assign more than one number
to the same object or class of objects. An example of a nominal scale is




The empirical operations necessary for the establishment of &n ordin-
al scale are the determination of equality and of rank ordering (deteraiifta-
tion of greater than or less than). The distinguishing characteristic of
the ordinal scale is that it maintains its structure under any order-pre-
serving transformation. That is„ the scale values on an ordinal scale
may be replaced by any monotonically increasing function of those values.
An example of an ordinal scale is the "order" statistic encountered in the
field of non-parametric statistics. The "classical" utility measure is an-
other example of an ordinal scale.
Interval _Scale
The basic empirical operations normally associated with the establish-
ment of an interval scale are the determination of equlity 8 of rank order-
ing, and of equality of intervals or differences. The interval scale is
the first of those thus far discussed which is "quantitative" in the ordin-
ary sense. The distinguishing characteristic of the interval scale is than
it maintains its structure under a linear transformation. That is 9 values
on an interval scale may be replaced by different values arrived at by
transformations of the form y - ax + b, An alternative way of stating
the above is that the choice of the zero point and the unit point are arbi-
trary. Mathematical operations permitted on numbers of an interval scale
are those which are' not affected by linear transformations. The follow-
ing are included among the permissable operations; the formation of the
arithmetic mean
s
standard deviation9 order correlation and product -moment
correlation. Examples of interval scales are the Fahrenheit and the
Centigrade scales of temperature.
18

Stevens | 3 points out that the psychologist aspires to create
interval scales in his attempts at measurement. Psychological seal:
or measurement can be divided into two general types. The term "psycholo-
gical measurement" is generally reserved for the measurement of quail?
attributes for which there are no physical correlates^ such as the measure-
ment of leadership ability, the measurement of the degree to which an in-
dividual is conservative or liberal , or the measurement of an individuals
intelligence. The term "psychophysical measurement" , on the other hand,,
generally refers to the measurement of attributes for which there are known
physical correlates, such as the perceived heaviness of weights,, brightness
of light
s
8 and all such measurement of sensory perceptions fox which actual
14
physical measurements of some form or another exist. In both types of
measurements the psychologist seeks to achieve an interval scale because
of its quantitative nature.
Ratio Scale





established;, the least restricted in usefulness, in addition to the empiri-
cal operations necessary for the establishment of an interval scale s the
ratio scale further requires the determination of equality of ratios. The
distinguishing characteristic of the ratio scale is that it maintains its
structure under a transformation of the form y ax. Alternatively^, it
might be described as having an arbitrary unit point but a fixed zero point.
All of the mathematical operations are permitted on numbers of ratio scale.
Examples of ratio scales are most readily found in the field of physics.
All of the fundamental physical units 8 such as length and weight, are
based upon ratio scales.
Interval and ratio scales taken together are often referred to as
Cardinal scales (as opposed to Ordinal scales).
19

The Type of Scale Represented by the Von Newman- Morgenstera Utility Function
One must be extremely careful in classifying the Von Neurnan-Morgan
=
stern utility function as to the type of measure it represents,, It lies
somewhere between a "psychological measurement" and a "psychological mea-
surement" 8 as described above. Due to the fact that the Von Neuraan-Morgan
-
stern utility function maintains its structure under a linear transforma-
tions, one would tend to classify it as an interval measurement. This classi-
fication would be misleading;, however 8 because a little study will show that;
at best f it represents a "restricted" type of interval measurement.
Similarities to Interval Measure
In abstracting preference quantification into a mathematical model 8
Von Meuman and Morgenstern were very careful to ensure that every mathe-
matical relation or operation had a "'natural'" analogue in the real-world
situation. For example^ the natural analogue of the mathematical relation
°^>
B is the preferential relations, "is preferred to". The natural ana-
logue of the formation of convex combinations is the special gamble out-
lined in Assumption #2. The reader will note that both the relation
s
J? s
and the operation of forming convex combinations are associated with in-
I
terval measurement in the description above. The actual word used in the
paragraph on interval measurement is "mean" instead of "convex combination."
These characteristics^, then^ tend to reinforce the notion of an interval
measure.
Another example tending to relate the Von Neuman-Morganstern utility
function to interval measurement (in a negative sense) is given by the opera-
tion of addition. It will be noted that addition is not listed as one of
the "perrolssable" operations on numbers of an interval scale (the reader
can satisfy himself on this point by checking that the sum of two fahrenheit
20

temperatures when transformed to the centigrade scale does not yield the
same result as transferring each fahrenheit temperature individually and
then forming the sum). In their model for determining preference quanti-
fication. Von Neuman and Morgenstem very carefully restrict themselves to
determining preferences for individual prizes; i.e.,, they rule, out any
consideration of combinations of prizes. Therefore^ the natural analogue
of addition,, which they would interpret as the utility to an individual of
various combinations of prizes,, does not exist. As mentioned above „ this
is a '"negative"'1 reinforcement of the notion of interval measurement.
Key Difference Between the Von Neuman-Morganstern Measure and Interval
Measure.
Up until this point we have been listing evidence relating the Von
Neuman-Morgenstern utility measure to an interval scale of measure* V'e will
now discuss an extremely important difference between the two. The reader
will recall that one of the basic empirical operations listed as being neces-
sary for the establishment of an interval scale was the determination of
equality of differences. Not only do Von Neuman and Morganstern fail to
provide a natural analogue for such a determination; they do not even allow
for the operation of subtraction!
In the same sense that U(A) + U(B) would be interpreted as the utility
to the individual of receiving both prize A and prize B 8 Von Neuman and
Morgenstem apparently would interpret U(A) - U(B) as the utility to the
individual of going from prize B to prize A , As in the case of addi-
tion„ such a situation is not provided for in the utility assumptions.
Therefore;, subtraction is ruled out as having no natural analogue.
It is felt that Von Neuman and Morgenstem ruled out utility differences
21

to avoid expressions such as the following;:
represents the difference of the utilities of A and of ..
Although some interpretation could undoubtedly be given to the above e
pression
s
it would not possess the intuitive appeal of the simpler expression
actually used by Von Neuman and Morgenstern.
Summary
In summary, it is felt that the Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility could
best be classified as a "quasi- interval measure"' <, it has the distinguish-
ing characteristic of an interval measure 9 namely invariance under a linear
trans format ion
s
, but it is not arrived at by the basic empirical operation
necessary for the establishment of such a scale (indeed
SJ
such an operation
is considered invalid!). Von Neuman and Morgenstern seem to '"'slip in by
the back door'% in that they use as the basic empirical operation for the
establishment of their scale one of the operations listed as "permissible 1 '




CRITICISMS OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION
23

In any abstraction of a real-world situation into a mathematical
model 9 some assumptions must be made. Questions invariably arise con-
cerning the validity of these assumptions. The axioms underlying utility
theory are subject to such criticisms. In this section the objections most
frequencty raised will be discussed in some detail.
Intrans itivity of Preferences
It is frequently pointed out that the preference relation. ^ .
always transitive; i.e., if an individual prefers A to B and B to Cj, he
does not always prefer A to C. Von Neuman and Morgenstern say of prefer-
ence transitivity simply that it is "...a plausible and generally accepted
16
property" . Luce and Raiffa(L3) say that preference intransitivities can
arise because people often "...have only vague likes and dislikes and make
17
mistakes in reporting them" . Luce 9 in (L2) s states again that experi-
ments have been performed demonstrating the intansitivity of the preference
relation. He further adds, however^ that such an assumption is absolutely
essential to the development of the numerical utility function. Savage (E>1)
points out a specific example in which an individual would normally display
preference intransitivity. He adds that when he personally is confronted
with such an inconsistency, he re-evaluates his decision so as to eliminate
19
the intransitivity
In short 9 one might say that although the notion of preference trans-
itivity is not universally valid, the assumption is_ reasonable
s
and in many
cases is representative of human behavior.
Intransitivity of Indifference
Another criticism which is often linked with the one above is that
indifference is not necessarily transitive. As an example of the intran-
sitivity of indifference consider the following situation. The effect of
24
,
seasoning upon food is to be tested. It is reasonable to expect that an
individual will be indifferent between a (reasonably large) portion of un-
salted food and an equivalent portion containing one grain of salt. Similar-
ly s he would be indifferent between a portion containing one grain and a por-
tion containing two grains of salt. Carrying the experiment to its con-
clusions, we would reasonably expect the individual to be indifferent be-
tween a portion containing N grans and a portion containing N plus 1 grains
of salt. If indifference wet transitive^ it would necessarily follow
that the individual would be indifferent between an unsalted portion and a
portion containing an arbitrarily large amount of salt"
An axloimatization of the utility function without the requirement for




ASSUMPTION #2 9 which states that every prize A is indifferent to some
gamble involving A. and A
s
is known as the "Archimedean. ixiom". It is
JL t
sometimes criticized on the gro-unds that it is not universally valid. Luc®
and Raiffa (L3) cite the following rather extreme example in which the
assumption does not seem to hold. Let A consist of $1.00; A, $0.01 ; and A.
r 1
death. Many feel that an individual would not be indifferent between re-
ceiving $0.01 and taking part in any gamble which involves $1.00 and desth 9
and which places positive probability on death. Others might argue 9 however^
that the individual would be indifferent to such a gamble^ if the probability
of death were small enough.
The inclusion of the assumption restricts the utility to what is com-
monly referred to as one dimension. The proponents of the archimeccan
assumption point out that it is plausible and that it is applicable in a
great number of situations.
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Relaxation of this assumption leads to an n- dimensional utility func-
Work has been done in this field,, and will be mentioned in a later
"Utility of Gambling"
A criticism frequently mentioned in connection with the Von Neuman-
Morgeastern utility function concerns gambling. It is pointed out that
preference determinations based upon a series of gambles are subject to dis-
tortions of considerable magnitude. This distortion results from the fact
that the individual might have a specific utility or disutility for the act
of gambling itself. Von Neuman and Morgenstern state that their axioms do
not take into consideration a utility of gambling because of the extreme
20
difficulty in axiomatizing so elusive a concept. The elimination of
this drawback from the utility function remains an unsolved problem. The
work of Davidson,, Suppes„ and siegel 8 to be discussed in a later section,,
attempts to minimise any distortion introduced by the act of gambling.
The Redaction of Complex Gambles to Simple Gamb les
Savage (SI) discusses a common criticism concerning complex gambles
which goes as follows:
Given a complex gamble,, i.e.,, a gamble involving as prizes other gamble?
and a simple gamble yielding only the basic prizes
5 given further,, that the
complex gamble eventually yields the basic prizes with the same probability
as does the simple gamble. It is not intuitively compelling that an in-
dividual would be indifferent between the complex gamble and the simple
gamble o Savage defends the assumption on the grounds of reasonableness
a lone
s pointing out that " u .,a cash prize is to a large extent a lottery
ticket in that the uncertainty as to what will become of a person if he
has a gift of a thousand dollars is not in principle different from the
26

uncertainty about what will become of him if he holds a lottery ticket of
21
considerable actuarial value" „ Von Neuman and Morgenstern
s
who refer to
this axiom as the "...one which comes closest to excluding a "utility of gam-
22
bling "" g state that it "...seems to be plausible and legitimate—unless a
much more refined system of pschology is used than the one now available
23
for the purposes of economics," ' Luce and Raiffa (L3) state that the
assumption tends to "..abstract away all "joy of gambling P in I isap^iase ° 8
24
and so on". They point out that a nice example of a complex gamble exists
in the form of the Paris lotteries which have as their prices tickets in the
Some more general criticisms of the structure of utility theory are
the following.
Static ^ULiare ol %hm Theory
it is generally accepted that an individual's preference patterns
are time dependents i.e. 8 an individual's preferences change with time.
Modern utility theory does not take into account time dependency
s
and in
this sense is static. Von Neuman and Morgenstern refer to time dependence
as an "unnecessary complication" and state that the difficulty "...can be
obviated by locating all "events" in which we are interested at one and
25
the same standardised moment
s
preferably in the immediate future". Bohnert
gtates however 9 that "...a complete interpretation
ted until the static concept is unambiguously related to t:
concepts. We cannot in fact be said to have a concept at all but
26
partial set of specifications for one"

88 Fortable'" Ma tore of the Theory
Another criticism advanced by Bohnert (B3)i, (B4) s is that In the
measurement of utility,, the methodology must be applied Independently to
each problem and situation as it arises. He states that "...the concept
is to be treated as a sort of portable partial framework;, carried from
problem to problem^ to be filled out In structure and exact significance
according to the demands of the specific problem. This would render it un-
like any concept in the physical sciences,, although Its supporters often
compare the development of the utility concept to that of "temperature 05
Speaking of the general decision-making problem (into which category
utility theory falls);, Savage (SI) says that the infinity of decisions
facing an individual during his lifetime could be looked upon as a ""single
grand decision". He adds that although many,, including himself
s
find the
concept of overall decision stimulating;, almost all practical applications
of the theory of decision must be confined to relatively simple situations.
He further states^ however 8 that all theories of personal decision are base?
upon the belief "..that some of the individual decision situations into
which people tend to subdivide the single grand decision do recapitulate in
microcosm the mechanism of the idealized grand decision".
In the preceding paragraph mention was made of the practical necessity
of Halting the utility function to a finite set of prices as opposed to
the "infinite" set of prizes among which an individual must choose during it
lifetime. The inability of the individual to state preferences over an arbi-
trarily large set of prizes plus the variance of the individual's prefer-
ences over the long time span which would be required for such a procedure 8
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is the basis for the practical restriction. However^ precise verifica-
tion of the theory for only a finite set of prizes still require 3 an in-
finite number of comparisons. The reader will recall that the thecry ire-
quires that the individual be able to state preferences for all possible
gambles involving the basic set of prizes „ There are an infinite number
of such gambles
o
Bavids©n 8 Suppes 9 and Siege 1 (D3) point out that the theory cannot be
completely verified because no one can ever compare an infinite list of
alternatives. They further state that ".. .Justification of such infinite
:s in physics-- for example 8 intervals of time 9 twice differentiable
continuous forces --plausibly rests on the high degree of a|
Lch measurements,, based on physical theory
s
can b® carried out. Is
the domain of the theory of rational choice 8 it is at present an ©pen quea
29
tion whether there are empirically applicable quantitative concepts".
Luce and Miffa (L3) point out that 8 in actual practice^ one might
proceed as follows; Empirically determine the utility of several point @ 9
say CpBjEgCg by comparing them with the least preferred and the most pre-
ferred 9 say A and B. The theory then should allow us to make predictions
about various other gambles involving A B 8 C 8 B 8 E 8 F„ If these predictions
are experimentally confirmed for several of these gambles 9 then one would
possess some degree of confidence that he had obtained "...a portion of tl
.30
ffiABXLIS:
In addition to the above criticisms of the Von Meuman-Morgenstern
Eunction 9 there is a fundamental criticism which goes to the very
roots ©f the whole Von Neuman-Morgenstern approach. This criticism is




the foundations of probability.
Objective,, Subjective,, and Logical Probability
Although It is not the intent of this paper to discuss the foundations'
underlying probability theory 9 it does seem necessary to point out thi I
there are three distinct schools of thought concerning probability.
Th® ""objective"" notion is probably the most widely known and widely
held. The objective interpretation of probability is as follows ; the pro-
bability,, p» of the occurrence of an event 9 a s is the limiting value of the
number of occurrences of a In m identical and independent experiments 8
as a goes to infinity. Feller (Fl) says ",,,we shall not worry whether or
not our conceptual experiment can be performed; we shall analyze abstract
31
models'" „ He adds that it is only necessary that one know all the possible
outcomes of the experiment. The axiomatization of objective probability is
32
generally attributed to Kolmogoroff . The objective interpretation is the
basis of almost all modern work In statistics. In their development of the
utility functions, ¥on Neuman and Morgenstern apply this interpretation of
33probability j which they characterize as "..frequency In long runs'".
The subjective interpretation of probability ls 9 In the words of one
34
of its proponents^ a somewhat more' extreme position . The subjective pro-
bability of the occurrence of an event » a
s
Is defined as the measure of the





the concept of subjective probability might technically be traced back to
the eighteenth century and Thomas Bsyas 9 the modern development is attribu-
ted to Frank Ramsey (1926). More recently Bruno DeFinetti and L. J. Savage
have made major contributions to the theory. The reader is referred to (SI)
for a complete discussion of subjective probability
s
including an axioms- i
zation of a quantitative measure.
30

„rd interpretation is generally referred to as "logical" pro-
bability or "necessary" probability. The logical view holds that "",. pro-
bability measures the extent to which one set of propositions, out of logi-
cal necessity and, apart from human opinion, confirms the truth of another.."
It is generally regarded '"..as an extension of logic, which tells when one
35
set of propositions necessitates the truth of another" 8 "' . The modern develop-
ment of the logical interpretation of probability is generally attributed to
>lf Carnap. Eohnert (B4) states that although Carnap's work has not
provided a very general theory of logical probability,, "..the development
,36
of more general theories seems inevitable
The Ma in Points of Controversy Between the "Objectivists" and the Subj ecti-
vests"
Due possibily to the lack of a development of a general theory of logi-
cal probability, the main arguments are between the "Objectivists^ and the
"Subjectivists". The objectivist asserts that the relative frequency intre-
pertation is the only interpretation leading to a mathematical theory of
probability, and that any subjective interpretation, although it might be
classified under the general heading of "probability",, is not amenable to
mathematical interpretation. The following quotation from Von Mises (VI)
is a rather extreme example of the objective viewpoint. He states that
"..it is not a mistake to say that you are "probably going to stay at home
this afternoon™, or that "Mrs. X will probably call for tea . What should
be prohibited is any suggestion of the existence of connexions however loose,
between statements of this kind and the Theory of Probability.. - con-
fusion of different spheres, the use of mathematical formulas in dealing
with subjects which are. not in the least suitable for such treatment --a 11





on the other hand 8 argues that the objective inter-
pretation is too restrictive. He points out that many probability situa-
tions are meaningless when considered from the relative frequency viewpoint.
For exaiBple 8 one might reasonably ask what the probability is that Germany
will become a monarchy in the next year. Obvious ly 8 a relative frequency
experiment is not even conceptually meaningful. But Savage's subjective
formulation^ for example^ could theoretically provide a quantitative mea-
sure of this probability (at least from the viewpoint of the individual mak-
ing the probability statement). It is argued that the subjective formula-
tion also encompasses those situations normally associated with the relative
frequency interpretation;, such as the probabilities involved in coin toss-
ing.
Savage points out that some authors hold that each interpretation of
probability has its applications^ dependent upon the particular situation
3£
under analysis This writer would venture to express agreement with the
Specific "Subject ivist" Criticisms of the Von Neuman-Morgemstern Utility
Function.
As applied specifically to the Von Neuman-Morgenstem utility function
s
the criticisms of the Subjectivists can best be summarized by the follow-
ing quotation from Bavidson 9 SuppeSj, and Siegel (D3) s "".<>..
(1) In order to apply the Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility theory it is
necessary that there be objective probabilities. But many philoss
phers and statisticians dispute this point; and those that do not
are not agreed how object iv probabiT:: : re determined.
(2) Even if there are objective probabilities^ when we come to apply
a theory of rational decision we need a behavioristic test to
32

tell whether someone (curse Ives 8 perhaps) is acting in accord
with the objective probabilities.
Assuming there are objective probabilities^ and that peopl
on them when they know them 9 there are nevertheless very many
situations in which there is no way to compute even roughly the
39
objective probabilities. 18
As a result of the above criticisms^ Davidson,, Suppes and Siegel have
a3€iomati:2ed a utility function based upon subjective probability. Their
work will be discussed in a later section.
"Logical" Criticisms of the Von Neuman-Morgenstern Utility Function
The proponents of the logical interpretation of probability criticize
the logical structure of the Von Neuman-Morgenstem utility function. Bohn-
it of a utility
based upon the logical interpretation of probability. The interested rei





RECENT WORK IN THE FIELD OF UTILITY
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It Is the purpose of this section to mention briefly some examples
of recent work, both theoretical and experiments 1, in the field of util:
The list Is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely to be representative of
the types of work being done.
A great portion of recent theoretical work might be classified as
"variations on the Von Neuman and Morgenstern theme,/' This includes such
things as alternative derivations, amplifications, and generalizations*
Among others, Bl&ckwell and Girschick (B2), Savage (SI), and Herstein and
Milnor (H3) 9 give alternative axiomatizations and derivations of the Von
Neuman-Morgenstern utility function. Marschak (Ml) 9 gives a geometrically
oriented derivation of the special case in which there are only a finite
number of prizes. Luce (L>2) gives an axlomatization which relaxes the re-
quirement of transitivity of indifference. Debreu (D5) gives a theoretical
discussion of the conditions necessary, in addition to the ordering rela-
tion, to ensure the existence of a numerical utility function. Hausner
(HI), and Thrall and Dalkey O!), axiomatize a multidimensional utility
function, which includes the Von Neuman and Morgenstern function as a spec-
ial case.
In addition to theoretical papers related rather directly to the Von
Neuman and Morgenstern function, there exists a growing body of work devot-
ed to a subjective probabilistic utility function. Among others, Luce, in
the appendix of (L3), and more fully in (Ll) presents an axiomatlzation of a
utility function based upon subjective probabilities. Davidson, Suppes and
Siegel (D3) present a different formulation, again involving the use of
subjective probabilities. Debreu (D6) gives a topological derivation of
the Davidson, Suppes and Siegel formulation. Marschak (M2) gives a simple




A General Discussion of the Davidson Suppes and Siegel Formulation of a
Subjective Probabi listic Utility Function .
Although the primary purpose of this paper is to present a rat fees' com-
plete discussion of the Von Neuman-Morganstern utility function,, it is felt
that a sens® of completeness dictates the inclusion of some remarks concern-
ing the subjective probabilistic approach to a utility function. The formu-
lation of Oavids@n 9 Suppes and Siegel has been chosen because of the exten-
sive work of the authors in the area. The discussion will be limited to a
general description of the method employed, plus a few comments by tfe-
writer. The formal axiomatixation will be omitted.
One ©f the reasons given by the authors for the development of this
new model of preference quantification is the difficulty of empirically
verifying Von Neuman and Morgenstern s work (due to the infinite number of
comparisons required). Another reason given is the authors" reluctance to
accept the objective probabilistic concept employed by Von Neuman and Morgan-
stern.
The authors list as one of the main problems in establishing & utility
measure that of separating "psychological" (subjective) probabilities from
utilities. As an illustration of this idea 9 consider the following ex-
ample. Suppose that an individual is given a lottery ticket worded as
follows:
"If it rains tomorrow you will receive $100, If it does not rain 9 you
must pay the bank $10." The individual is then given the opportunity to
sell the lottery ticket. What information could be gained about the in-
dividual from the sale price he places on the ticket? Davidson et al would
point out that the price represents both the degree of belief fee Id b^
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individual concerning rain (the subjective probability of rate) and the re-
lative utilities of the monies involved.
Although the above example is a good illustration of the interrelation
between subjective probability and utility, it is not illustrative of the
manner in which the authors actually make use of subjective probabilities
in their formulation. The following example is more indicative of th&t use,
and also serve? t- ifference between the subjective approach
and the objective approach.
An individual is given a gambling ticket worded as follows? "You will
receive $100 if a certain chance event occurs" or you will pay the bank
$10 if the chance event does not occur. The statistical (objective probabil-
ity of the occurrence of the chance event is .9; the probability of non-
occurrence, ol"
individual is then given the opportunity to sell the tickt
Davidson et al would again point out that the sale price is dependent upon
the relative utilities of the monies and upon the degree of belief of the
individual that the chance event will occur. In other words, the subjec-
tive probability of the chance event might not necessarily be .9. Instead,
it would depend upon the particular individual and upon the chance mechanism
employed (rolling of dice, drawing of cards, etc), which presumably would
be specified at the time the ticket was given to the individual.
Von Neuman and Morgenstern, on the other hand, would interpret the sale
price as a measure of utility alone, with no probabilistic complications.
In their formulation, it would be assumed that a "rational 00 individual would
accept the stated statistical probabilities at face value.
Method of Davidson^ Suppes and Siege 1
:e a "true" interval
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based upon a fundamental determination of equality of utility differences,,
Their utility function is developed for a finite number of prizes and
based upon a finite number of comparisons. Having established a utility
measure over a specialized set of prizes,, the authors propose to use these
utilities in developing a quantitative measure of subjective probability.
A general description of the method can best be given in terms of the
experimental environment employed by the authors in verifying their theory.
It is somewhat surprising;, in the field of utility theory 9 to find that
authors follow up their formal derivation with an empirical verification^
the verification being based upon a controlled experiment involving a group
of individuals gambling with small amounts of money. Very briefly,, their
method can be describe^ as follows;
Stegjt
The first step is the determination of a chance event which has a sub=
jective probability of .5. This is achieved as follows ; Let b and c be
prizes (small amounts of money; b being larger than c). Let E be a chance
event. Designate the subjective probability of E by S(E) 9 a^d the sub-
jective probability of "not E'* by 8(E). A game is played in which the
player must choose between two options. If he chooses Option I, he will
receive "b" when E occurs 9 and n c
n when E occurs. If he chooses Option II P
he will receive "c" when E occurs and " bn when E occurs. In the authors




event 8 E* s is them found such that
between Option I and Option II ;
x o e o ;i
player
sue nor:s state that this particular chance event has a subjective
pr






sameer E* or E*o
ers representing E* and the




of the subjects showed a }f)pre£er=
was true of a diej, with the even
r
s E*; similarily s for other simple
one particular chance mechanism
ing the event E*
presenting the event
were the letters "'ZOJ 1'
;,
represent-
and on the other three faces were the letters "ZEJ"',, re-n
E*. The out that the letters were choses
practically no association value,,
The next step is the establishment of an interval utility measure over
a very special set of prizes utilizing the chance event determined in Step I,





'V such that the Individual is Indifferent
between the following opt:
Event
authors would give the following mathematical representation to
this situation:
0(a) >°U{b) + ^U(c)
+ - U(a) * guW + •>-»r <J(a;
>r U(a) + J(a) U(b) + U(c)
>r U(a) - U(c) - U(b) - U(a)
gre "If" represents utility)




additional prices^ "d" Cmore preterabie
erable than 'V) 8 such that the Individual
order to shorten the notation,, designate a situation such as (2) s (a
>
s
<n> — w 9
he individual must also be indifferent between the following options
t
s




s e * b,c
(c) b 9 e a s c
(d) d
s
e ss a s a
The authors maintain that Steps I and II yield an interval measure-
ment of utility over the prizes aj,b
s
c 9 d s e and that the prizes are "'equa




From II, (1) U(a) - U(c) U(b) - U(a)
Similarly
From 11,(2), (a) : U(d) - U(b) s U(a) - U(c)
(b): U(c) - U(e) - U<
(c); U(b) - U(a) = U(c) - U(e)
(d); U(d) - U(a) - U(a) - U(e)
srefore^
U(c) - U(e) = U(a) - U(c) - U(b) - U(a) U(d) -
(Step II can be extended to include an arbitrary number of prizes
The next step is a procedure for numerically evaluating, a subjective
probability 8 other than 5 9 using the utility differences determined above,,
The procedure will be illustrated by a trivial example yielding a sub-
jective probability of one. Designate the unknown subjective probability










o r 1 - S
S(E}0(d) + |T - 8(E)j U(b) - S(E)U(d) + | - S(E)]d(c)
or
or
) + U(c) - U(b) s U(c)
Although the above description of the preference model formulated by
Davidson 8 Suppes and Siegel is lacking in preciseness^ it is hoped that the
basic ideas of the authors have been accurately represented,. The interested
reader is referred to (D3) for a complete description of this models and of
two other models developed by the authors^ which are less restricted than
the one here described.
Critical Comments
It is felt that Von Neuman and Morgenstern would be disturbed by the
free and easy manner in which Davidson 9 Suppes and Siegel employ mathematical
operations. For example
s
consider the following expression?
U(a) U(b) + U(c)
Von Neuman and Morgenstern would never allow the following mathematical
42

manipulations on the above expression;




UCa) + Ufa* + 0(c
Operations of this type 9 how@ver 9 are basic to the method of Bavidson s
Suppe® and Siege I,
defl
should be point®
referential int ions for
hod does not explicit!
s of addition
|c) * U(b) - U(a) is interpreted to mean ttract ion c Prgiu,




Addition seems to be used for the sol
of utility differences,.
Relatively little experim<
utility theory Luce and Raiffa refer t
"probably the most experimentally elegant in the ar
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they were attempting to maximize expected utility even when they do
not make choices in accord with actuarial values.
3. For such people it is possible to construct a utility curve unique
up to a linear transformation. The curves of the subjects tested
showed certain interesting common features; so far as it was possible
to compare the results seemed well in accord with Hosteller and Nogee"?
4 Of the 15 subjects whose utility curves were determined;, 12 had
curves which were not linear in money.
5. Some evidence was obtained for the secular stability of subjects
utility curves. On remeasurement 9 7 out of 8 subjects gave responses
which were substantially consistent with the original results.
6. For a single chance event with an objective probability of 1/4
S)
it was shewn how the method leads to the measurement of subject:
probability. For 5 out of 7 subjects^ it was possible to calculate





probability was less than 1/4, '"
Experimental Work of Mosteller and Nogee
Some five years prior to the work of Davidson^ Suppes and Siegel 8 Host-
eller and Nogee conducted an experiment to verify the theory of Von Neuman
and Morgenstem. This experiment is covered in detail In (H3). The veri-
fication was based upon the Investigation of the behavior of some twenty
subjects in simple gambling situations Involving small amounts of money.
From their result
s
8 Hosteller and Nogee concluded that it was ex-
perimentally feasible to construct utility curves for an individual In
simple gambling situations, that these curves could be used to predict
behavior In more complex gambling situations; and that the theoretical
44

assumption of preference and indifference transitivity was not fully
supported experimental ly„
Davidson,, Suppes and Siegel (D3) criti2e 9 in some detail 8 the
work of Hosteller and Nogee. They maintain that their procedure did
not provide a systematic check for uniqueness up to a linear transfer
i
tion; that the procedure allowed for a maximum distortion by any specific
utility of gambling which might have been present; and that subjective
probabilities were assumed to be equal to- objective probabilities. The









The development of the Von Neuman- Morgenstern utility function was
prompted by the need for such a measure in the field of game theory . The
validity of any decisions arrived at by the mathematical applications of
game theory hinges upon the validity of the utilities assigned to the
various "outcomes".
Bernoulli was the first to point out the need for a scale,, other than
money,, with which to measure utility. In succeeding years economists have
grappled with the notion of utility, but, for the most part, their efforts
have yielded only an ordinal measure of utility. However, such a measure
is not sufficiently precise to have many applications. In particular, It
is of little use in the field of game theory. The utility function postu-
lated by Von Neaman and Morgenstern Is one of the first efforts leading to
a true quantitative measure; that is, a measure which is unique up to a
linear transformation.
The assumptions underlying the Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility func-
tions are frequently subject to criticism. These criticisms are generally
of two types: (1) Counterexamples can be cited which demonstrate that
individuals do not always behave in accordance with the assumptions.
(2) The theory is extremely difficult to verify even in simple situations.
Some recent authors have developed modified versions of the theory,
which relax some of the axioms under criticism. Other authors have es-
sentially departed from the approach of Von Neuman and Morgenstern in an
attempt to develop a theory more susceptible to empirical verification.
A relatively small amount of experimental work has been done in the.
field of utility. The results, although encouraging, are inevitably based
upon simple gambling situations involving small amounts of money.

practical limitations of utility theory in the more complex:
military and economic ""real-world"' situations constitute the major
obstacle to the full utilization of mathematical game theory in these
interesting areas. Many feel that the best one could hope to achieve in
such situations would be a rough approximation of the utility ; I ion.
Nevertheless
s utility theory represents an important application of
the scientific method in the complex field of psychology. As such
s
it
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3o (si), p 69.
4. (M2) 8 P 22 Q
5. (SI), p 92.
6. (Bl), pp 23-26
7. (Sl) 8 pp 92-93
8„ (T4), p 221.
11 o (C3)s, pp 19-37. The entire discussion on mathematical models paraphra?
es portions of the above paper.
12. The assumptions quoted are t^ose given by Luce and Rai££a s (L3) pp 25-
30 o The authors state that these are very similar to those postal
by Von Meuroan and Morganstern.
13. Unless otherwise noted,, the general discussion on ^ sasurement scales
is taken in its entirety from ($5).
14. (C2), p 480.
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16.
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20. (V2), p 28.
21. (SI), p 99.
22. (¥2), p 28.
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24. (L3), p 26.
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(B4);, p 223o To be precise*, Mr. Bohnert is directing this criticism
against the classical concept of utility and not specifically against
the Von Newman-Morgenstern formulation. However^ this criticism
s
as
well as the "static" criticism 8 is specifically aimed at the
Morgenstern utility in an earlier version of this same paper s
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29. (D3), p 8.
30. (L3) 8 P 35.
31. (Fl), P 5,
32. (SI), P 3.
33. (V2) 9 P 19.
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38. ((SI) a p 62. It should be pointed out that this viewpoint is not nec-
essarily shared by Mr. Savage.
39. (D3), p 11.
40 o (13), p 35.
41. (B3« 9 pp 80-81.
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